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“ ‘What decides wars is what starts them—politics.’ ”1
“The great play of sovereignty, with all its pomp and panoply, can
now be seen for what it hides: a posturing troupe of human actors,
who when off-stage are sometimes prone to rape the chorus.”2
Sovereignty rests at the core of debates over the validity of humanitarian intervention in situations of grave crisis and loss of life.
All too frequently, opponents of sovereignty use the concept to halt
international action aimed at stopping or lessening human suffering
in a sovereign state. Sovereignty as a blockade, however, is an incomplete understanding of the doctrine. While sovereignty protects
the right of a nation to exist and govern itself, proponents of the Responsibility to Protect (hereinafter RTP) as a norm of international
law recognize that sovereignty entails the responsibility to protect
populations from human rights abuses. Finding its grounding in multiple international treaties and the concept of sovereignty itself, the
RTP doctrine makes strides in overcoming the non-intervention
norm. As a non-binding norm, however, RTP cannot overcome a second common block to intervention: lack of political will. To ensure
∗ J.D., 2011, Magna Cum Laude, Florida State University College of Law; MSc,
2007 with merit in Social Anthropology, London School of Economics and Political Science;
A.B., 2006, Magna Cum Laude with High Honors in Anthropology, Davidson College. I
would like to thank Professor Lesley Wexler for her guidance and feedback during the writing process. My thanks also go to Seth Welner and Jon Harris Maurer at Florida State
University Law Review for all their hard work.
1. William Langewiesche, The Distant Executioner, VANITY FAIR, Feb. 2010, at 94,
available at http://www.vanityfair.com/politics/features/2010/02/sniper-201002 (quoting Martin Pegler, a preeminent warfare scholar). As discussed infra, political will is a significant
block to international intervention in conflicts which threaten human rights.
2. State sovereignty and non-intervention exist alongside political will as significant
blocks to intervention. GEOFFREY ROBERTSON, CRIMES AGAINST HUMANITY: THE STRUGGLE
FOR GLOBAL JUSTICE 399 (2d ed. 2002).
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international action will proceed in the face of grave human rights
abuses, scholars and proponents of RTP must better delimit the doctrine and transition RTP to a binding principle of international law,
as well as advocate for reform of the U.N. Security Council veto power.
I. HONORING THE SPIRIT OF INTERNATIONAL LAW
Following General Augusto Pinochet’s 1998 arrest, the British
House of Lords, over the course of three decisions, addressed the
question of whether Pinochet, as a head of state, could be legally responsible for torture and similar crimes against humanity perpetrated under his rule.3 The case presented a high profile opportunity
to address the issue of sovereign immunity4—an issue courts had yet
to fully explore due to nations’ reticence to prosecute other heads of
state.5 Ultimately, the House of Lords “confirmed the trend [started
at] Nuremberg,”6 finding that sovereign immunity does not shield
responsibility for crimes against humanity.7 Human rights scholar
and lawyer Geoffrey Robertson identifies one key aspect of the decision that goes beyond its precedential value for issues of sovereign
immunity: “[the] conclusion [is] a striking example of a court taking a
treaty not just at its word but (in the absence of express words) at its
spirit.”8 The Pinochet court refused to yield to the unspoken truth of
“cynical diplomacy”9: the concept that many nations sign treaties for
public relations more than out of the intent to be bound to the
treaty’s substance.10 Rather, the court “took the Torture Convention
to mean what it said”11: for torturers, no matter what position they
hold or how immune they may have believed themselves to be, there
is “no safe haven.”12
RTP—the concept that a nation is responsible for protecting its
citizens from atrocities within its borders and that its failure to do so
opens the door to international intervention13—presents an opportu3. Id. at 393-95, 414-18.
4. See id. at 414, 417.
5. Id. at 395 (“Never before had a former head of state, visiting another friendly
country, been held legally amenable to its criminal process.”).
6. Id. at 421.
7. Id. at 420-21.
8. Id. at 421.
9. Id. at 422.
10. See id. at 422.
11. Id.
12. Id. at 421.
13. INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT xi (2001), available at http://www.iciss.ca/report-en.asp [hereinafter ICISS
REPORT] (asserting that “State sovereignty implies responsibility, and the primary responsibility for the protection of its people lies within the state itself. . . . Where a population is
suffering serious harm, as a result of internal war, insurgency, repression, or state failure,
and the state in question is unwilling or unable to halt or avert it, the principle of nonintervention yields to the international responsibility to protect.”).
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nity to do for humanitarian intervention what the Pinochet cases did
for the concept of sovereign liability for crimes against humanity. In
Pinochet, the principle treaty at issue was the Convention Against
Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment
(CAT).14 Article 1 of the Convention defines torture as:
any act by which severe pain or suffering, whether physical or
mental, is intentionally inflicted on a person for such purposes as
obtaining from him or a third person information or a confession,
punishing him for an act he or a third person has committed or is
suspected of having committed, or intimidating or coercing him or
a third person, or for any reason based on discrimination of any
kind, when such pain or suffering is inflicted by or at the instigation of or with the consent or acquiescence of a public official or
other person acting in an official capacity.15

If the U.K. court interpreted the CAT as leaving sovereign immunity
unaltered, it would have arrived at the following “self-defeating syllogism: Only public officials can commit torture. Public officials are
immune from prosecution. Nobody can ever be prosecuted for torture.”16 Rejecting this outcome, the court advanced the CAT by coming to the only decision that could uphold both the words and the
core meaning of the treaty: that sovereign immunity did not survive
the ratification of the CAT.17
RTP draws its strength from even richer ground than that of sovereign liability: the U.N. Charter, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights, the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide, the Geneva Conventions and its Additional
Protocols, the Rome Statute establishing the ICC, the International
Convention on Civil and Political Rights, and the concept of sovereignty itself.18 How lawyers and policymakers delimit and implement
RTP in the coming years will influence whether the international
community will continue to advance the spirit, as well as the letter,
of these documents, or whether it will stand idly by as the next
Rwanda, Darfur, or Congo unfolds.
In its current form, RTP succeeds in addressing one of the principle blocks to intervention—the non-intervention norm. The non14. ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 421.
15. Convention Against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman and Degrading Treatment
art. 1, adopted and opened for signature Dec. 10, 1984, S. Treaty Doc. No. 100-20,1465
U.N.T.S. 85 (emphasis added).
16. ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 419.
17. Id. at 419-21.
18. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, para. 2.26; HIGH COMM’R FOR HUMAN RIGHTS,
Involvement of Sudanese Security Personnel in Attacks on the Bulbul Area of South Darfur
from January to March 2007, 10 (May 18, 2007), available at www2.ohchr.org/SPdocs/
Countries/7thOHCHR18may07.doc (identifying the International Convention on Civil and
Political Rights as a foundation for a nation’s responsibility to protect its citizens).
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intervention norm is the concept that sovereignty demands foreign
nations refrain from interjecting themselves into the domestic affairs
of another nation.19 This success aside, RTP’s status as a non-binding
norm does little to address the other principle block to international
intervention in humanitarian crises—lack of political will. Scholars
and policymakers have laid the foundation, but RTP requires further
work. To succeed in preventing future atrocities—to honor the spirit
and letter of foundational international law—RTP must transition
from a non-binding norm to a binding principle of international law.
The proposals of this Note combine existing U.N. action on RTP, the
International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty
(ICISS) proposals, and scholarship on intervention to construct an
RTP doctrine which is broad enough to be effective while narrow
enough to be adopted by the international community.
II. PRINCIPLE BARS TO INTERVENTION
A. Sovereignty and the Non-Intervention Norm
Sovereignty lends itself to multiple definitions. Less cynical scholars define it as:
the notion that in every system of government there must be some
absolute power of final decision . . . . [It is] the legal identity of the
state in international law, an equality of status with all other
states, and the claim to be the sole official agent acting in international relations on behalf of a society.20

Others view the doctrine more cynically, defining it as “the doctrine
of non-intervention in the internal affairs of nation states asserted by
all governments which have refused to subject the treatment they
mete out to their citizens to any independent external scrutiny.”21
Sovereignty is, in part, a relational concept, as nations must respect
the sovereign status of other nations for the system to flourish.22 Regardless of how scholars define the concept, however, it is a foundation of international law and domestic governance.23 Advocates of
RTP ground the doctrine in the concept that sovereignty does not
confer only power, but also responsibility.24 However, nations and
policymakers interpreting sovereignty have not always been as similarly progressive as RTP advocates.

19. See ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at xxx.
20. Ramesh Thakur, In Defence of the Responsibility to Protect, 7 INT’L J. HUM. RTS.
160, 165 (2003).
21. ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at xxx.
22. Thakur, supra note 20, at 166 (“A condition of any one state’s sovereignty is a
corresponding obligation to respect every other state’s sovereignty.”).
23. See id. at 165-66.
24. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xi; see Thakur, supra note 20, at 165-66.
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Until recently, the international community largely understood
the non-intervention norm to be the necessary corollary to sovereignty.25 Non-intervention essentially requires that one nation not
interfere with the sovereign, domestic affairs of another nation.26 The
U.N. Charter reifies the concept in Article 2(7)27:
Nothing contained in the present Charter shall authorize the
United Nations to intervene in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state or shall require the Members to submit such matters to settlement under the present Charter; but this principle shall not prejudice the application of enforcement measures under Chapter VII.28

Even advocates of RTP emphasize the continued importance of nonintervention to maintaining international stability.29 However, as
discussed infra, the RTP doctrine recognizes the non-intervention
norm without granting it the power to paralyze international response to atrocities within a sovereign state.30
Lord Millet, who heard the Pinochet cases, cautioned against fetishizing31 sovereignty so as to make it a cloak concealing all manner
of sins of the sovereign. Only a few years after the landmark Pinochet
decisions, then Secretary-General Kofi Annan echoed Lord Millet’s
warning. Noting the difficulties of answering when and how humanitarian intervention should proceed, Annan emphatically asserted
that “surely no legal principle—not even sovereignty—can ever shield
crimes against humanity.”32 RTP, as a doctrine, both expresses
agreement with Annan’s statement and provides a means of ensuring
that those who would fetishize sovereignty will no longer dominate
the discussion on international responsibility in the face of atrocities.
B. Weak or Absent Political Will
The current Secretary-General of the U.N., Ban Ki-moon of the
Republic of Korea, found the recent crisis in Darfur to have “highlighted how inadequate our policy tools are and how fleeting is the
25. See William R. Pace & Nicole Deller, Preventing Future Genocides: An International Responsibility to Protect, 36 WORLD ORDER 15, 16-17 (2005). See also Thakur, supra
note 20, at 165.
26. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7; see ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at xxx; Thakur, supra
note 20, at 165.
27. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, para 2.8.
28. U.N. Charter art. 2, para. 7.
29. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, paras. 2.7-2.8.
30. Id. paras. 4.10-4.14. The report asserts that nations have a “responsibility to react
to situations of compelling need for human protection.” Id. para. 4.1. This responsibility
logically requires a “departure” from the non-intervention norm. Id. para. 4.11.
31. ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at 420 (footnote omitted).
32. U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples: The Role of the United Nations in the
Twenty-First Century, ¶ 219, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc A/54/2000 (Mar.
27, 2000) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples].

888

FLORIDA STATE UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 38:883

political will to use them.”33 Scholars advocating RTP nearly universally recognize lack of political will as a plague that cripples any
chance of intervention in humanitarian crises.34 This plague is particularly virulent when it squelches political will of the U.S.35 and the
other four permanent members of the Security Council (China, the
United Kingdom, France, and Russia) because of their veto power to
halt Security Council action.36 Perhaps more than any other single
factor, political will, by its presence or absence, determines whether
the international community will intervene in a foreign crisis.37
States are inconsistent in mustering political will to intervene in
crisis or punish their perpetrators.38 Liberal, legalist states—nations
which believe in the protection of individual civil and political rights
through the legal system39—like the U.S., exist in constant tension
between the “push-and-pull of idealism and selfishness.”40 This idealism, which both the government and the popular conscience of their
citizenry hold, embraces the concept that there are “[u]niversal human rights [which] do not respect ‘geographical morality’ or sovereignty.”41 A liberal state’s idealism, however, repeatedly conflicts
with the nation’s self-interest.42 As an outgrowth of this self-interest,
nations consistently hesitate to intervene in a foreign conflict unless
they themselves have been harmed.43 This self-interest squelches political will, particularly when a nation’s citizens are ambivalent about
a conflict.44 Scholars note that it is not wholly surprising “that even
liberal states value the lives of their own more than those of foreigners, but [surprising] how radically the lives of foreigners are dis33. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect, ¶ 59, delivered to the General Assembly, U.N. Doc. A/63/677 (Jan. 12, 2009) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing] (emphasis added).
34. See, e.g., ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, paras. 8.1-8.24; see also Rebecca J. Hamilton, Recent Development, The Responsibility to Protect: From Document to Doctrine—But
What of Implementation? 19 HARV. HUM. RTS. J. 289, 294 (2006).
35. Samantha Power, Raising the Cost of Genocide, in THE NEW KILLING FIELDS:
MASSACRE AND THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION 245, 260 (Nicolaus Mills & Kira Brunner,
eds., 2002) (“Without U.S. leadership, the last century showed, others will be unwilling to
step forward to act and genocide will continue.”).
36. Amnesty Int’l, UN: Governments Must Act Promptly and Effectively on Important
Human Rights Commitments in 2005 World Summit Document, AI Index IOR 41/062/2005
(Sept. 26, 2005), available at http://www.amnesty.org/en/library/info/IOR41/062/2005.
37. See Power, supra note 35, at 256; SAMANTHA POWER, “A PROBLEM FROM HELL:”
AMERICA AND THE AGE OF GENOCIDE 508-10 (2003).
38. See GARY JONATHAN BASS, STAY THE HAND OF VENGEANCE: THE POLITICS OF WAR
CRIMES TRIBUNALS 5-8 (2001) (focusing his work on explaining the inconsistencies of international support for war crimes tribunals).
39. Id. at 20-23.
40. Id. at 8.
41. Id. at 22.
42. See id. at 8, 29-32.
43. See id. at 276 (“The single best guarantee of a stung and moralistic reaction from
a liberal state has been its own victimization.”).
44. Id. at 28-32.
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counted,”45 in light of the idealistic principles of such nations.46 A
proposal for a binding RTP must build upon the idealism of liberal,
legalist states and be structured to prevent the inherent selfishness
of states from winning the day.
C. Rwanda: A Failure of Political Will
Critics of the international community’s failure to prevent atrocities frequently look to the Rwandan Genocide of 1994.47 It stands as a
profoundly chilling example of the devastating effects of inaction.48
Rwanda is a small, densely-populated country in East Africa whose
pre-genocide population was between 7 and 8 million.49 During its
colonial occupation, Belgium reified what had been fluid ethnic
boundaries, “racializ[ing]” the three ethnic groups: Tutsi, Hutu and
Twa.50 Before the Genocide, the Tutsi constituted approximately fifteen percent of the population, making Hutu the dominant ethnic
identity.51 In the span of one hundred days, beginning on April 6,
1994, the Interahamwe (a Hutu militia) and the Hutu-dominated
Rwandan Army murdered at least 800,000 Tutsi and “politically
moderate Hutu.”52 All the while, the international community
watched from afar what “would prove to be the fastest, most efficient
killing spree of the twentieth century.”53
The Rwandan Genocide provides a devastating case study of the
international community’s failure to muster political will. Then Republican Senator Bob Dole made a telling statement regarding
whether the U.S. should intervene: “I don’t think we have any national interest there . . . . The Americans are out, and as far as I am
concerned, in Rwanda, that ought to be the end of it.”54 Selfishness
defeated idealism. Though the international community had extensive intelligence on what was occurring,55 it simply fell in step with
45. Id. at 29.
46. See id. at 21-29.
47. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples, supra note 32, at ¶ 217 (“But to
the critics [of humanitarian intervention] I would pose this question: if humanitarian intervention is, indeed, an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to a
Rwanda . . . to gross and systematic violations of human rights that offend every precept of
our common humanity?”).
48. See, e.g., Human Rights Watch, Rwanda: Lessons Learned Ten Years After the
Genocide (Mar. 29, 2004), http://www.hrw.org/english/docs/2004/03/29/rwanda8308.htm.
49. Luc De Huesch, Rwanda: Responsibilities for a Genocide, 11 ANTHROPOLOGY
TODAY 3, 6 (1995).
50. MAHMOOD MAMDANI, WHEN VICTIMS BECOME KILLERS: COLONIALISM, NATIVISM,
AND THE GENOCIDE IN RWANDA 87-88 (2001).
51. PHILIP GOUREVITCH, WE WISH TO INFORM YOU THAT TOMORROW WE WILL BE
KILLED WITH OUR FAMILIES 29 (1998).
52. POWER, supra note 37, at 329-35.
53. Id. at 334.
54. Id. at 352.
55. Id. at 338-39, 354-55, 504-06.
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the U.S., which refused to even label the situation genocide.56 While
the U.S. called for a full withdrawal from Rwanda, ultimately the
U.N. kept a paltry and ineffective UNAMIR force of 270 troops in
Rwanda.57 The American public did not call for action, so the U.S.
government spearheaded the campaign for apathy, and won.58
After the Genocide, the international community searched for explanations and made apologies.59 Then Secretary-General Annan
commissioned an inquiry into Rwanda to attempt to explain how the
international community could have ignored the atrocity.60 The
Commission came to a simple conclusion: “The failure of the United
Nations . . . to stop the genocide in Rwanda was a failure by the
United Nations system as a whole . . . . There was a persistent lack of
political will by the Member States to act, or to act with enough assertiveness.”61 Political will was determinative in Rwanda. A binding
RTP doctrine can ensure that a lack of political will does not permit
another Rwanda by mandating action for certain international crimes.
III. RESPONSIBILITY TO PROTECT: DEFINING THE DOCTRINE
While many have addressed the question of whether humanitarian interventions are morally, legally, or pragmatically justified, this
Note seeks to determine how to galvanize existing support for and
delimit the boundaries of RTP as an avenue to intervention. Still, a
brief discussion of why the international community should intervene
provides necessary background to an analysis of RTP. The reasons to
intervene are straightforward: moral principles and the simple,
pragmatic reality that doing so saves lives.

56. See MOHAMED C. OTHMAN, ACCOUNTABILITY FOR INTERNATIONAL HUMANITARIAN
LAW VIOLATIONS: THE CASE OF RWANDA AND EAST TIMOR 33-34 (2005); see also POWER,
supra note 37, at 359 (“American officials again shunned the g-word. They were afraid that
using it would have obliged the United States to act under the terms of the 1948 genocide
convention . . . . A discussion paper on Rwanda, prepared by an official in the Office of the
Secretary of Defense . . . testifies to the nature of official thinking[;] . . . ‘Be Careful. Legal
at State was worried about this yesterday–Genocide finding could commit [the U.S. government] to actually ‘do something.’ ”).
57. POWER, supra note 37, at 369.
58. See id. at 373. The detrimental impact of the American public’s apathy exemplifies
how the public’s ambivalence fuels a nation’s selfishness and therein prevents intervention.
BASS, supra note 38, at 28-32.
59. See, e.g., POWER, supra note 37, at 386 (“With the grace of one grown practiced at
public remorse, [Clinton] issues something of an apology. ‘We in the United States and the
world community did not do as much as we could have and should have done to try to limit
what occurred . . . .’ ”).
60. See generally U.N. SECURITY COUNCIL, Report of the Independent Inquiry Into the
Actions of the United Nations During the 1994 Genocide in Rwanda, 3, U.N. Doc.
S/1999/1257 (Dec. 15, 1999).
61. Id.
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Whether based in a complex moral code or grounded in “simple
decency,”62 the fact that thousands and sometimes millions of individuals are killed, tortured, or otherwise degraded and denied fundamental human rights demands action. Rwanda is sufficient proof
of the atrocities man perpetrates, which “offend every precept of our
common humanity” and which the international community must not
ignore.63 Beyond the moral weight in favor of action, the efficacy of
past interventions supports future action.64 The last-act NATO intervention into Kosovo saved as many as 1.7 million Albanians from
persecution.65 Even in Rwanda, the miniscule U.N. force saved the
lives of 25,000 Rwandans.66 Intervention is thus, both an effective
tool, as well a moral endeavor.67 RTP doctrine advances both the
moral and practical goals of intervention.
A. Foundations of RTP
As early as 1988 the international community recognized a theoretical forerunner to RTP in the Velásquez Rodríguez case.68 The Inter-American Court of Human Rights heard the case, which raised
the issue of Honduras’s state liability for detaining and causing the
disappearance of Angel Manfredo Velásquez Rodríguez.69 Ultimately,
the court found that Honduras violated Articles 4 (right to life), 5
(right to humane treatment), and 7 (right to personal liberty) of the
American Convention on Human Rights.70 Most importantly for RTP,
the court recognized that a state has a duty of due diligence to persons within its borders.71 Specifically, a state, even if it does not
commit the violation of rights in question, has a duty of “due diligence to prevent the violation or to respond to it.”72 The court found
the due diligence principle in the obligation each State has under Ar62. Michael Walzer, Arguing for Humanitarian Intervention, in THE NEW KILLING
FIELDS: MASSACRE AND THE POLITICS OF INTERVENTION, supra note 35, at 19, 21.
63. U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples, supra note 32 at ¶¶ 217-19.
64. Power, supra note 35, at 255.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Critics of intervention argue that states will use the concept to engage in pretextual humanitarian interventions in the name of more selfish aims or that interventions are
too costly, ineffective, or inconsistent. U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples, supra note
32, at ¶ 216 (citing frequent objections to intervention). The proposals of this paper seek to
address those concerns by further defining RTP. A full discussion of these arguments is,
however, beyond the scope of this paper. For a discussion of such arguments and their
counter-arguments, see Ken Roth, Human Rights Watch, Human Rights Watch World
Report 2004 - War in Iraq: Not a Humanitarian Intervention, (JANUARY 1, 2004), available
at http://www.unhcr.org/refworld/pdfid/402ba99f4.pdf.
68. See generally Velásquez-Rodríguez v. Honduras, Merits, Judgment, Inter-Am. Ct.
H.R. (ser. C) No. 4, (July 29, 1988).
69. Id. ¶¶ 1-4.
70. Id. ¶¶ 2, 194.
71. Id. ¶ 172.
72. Id.
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ticle 1(1) of the Convention to “ ‘ensure’ the free and full exercise of
the rights” of its citizens.73 By failing to take sufficient action to protect citizens’ rights, the state failed to exercise its duty of due diligence.74 Though the court was not in a position to extend that responsibility to the international community, by developing the “due diligence principle” it opened the door to finding a state responsible for
its failure to protect those within its borders,75 and therein laid a
brick in the foundation of RTP.
The RTP doctrine first emerged under its now acronym-worthy
title in 2001.76 Between 2000 and 2001, the International Commission on Intervention and State Sovereignty (ICISS) conducted multinational meetings around the world to determine the “global political
consensus” on the relationship between sovereignty and humanitarian intervention.77 Participants formed the Commission to respond to
then Secretary-General Annan’s call to determine how the international community should react to mass atrocities such as Rwanda.78
The Canadian government spearheaded the meetings that yielded
the Commission’s 2001 report, The Responsibility to Protect.79 While,
as discussed infra, the U.N. followed its own course in recognizing
and defining RTP, a thorough understanding of the ICISS conception
of the doctrine is important as it provided the foundation for the U.N.
and gave guidance on structuring and implementing the doctrine.
Within its report, the ICISS articulates the guiding principles, legal foundations, and doctrinal outlines of the RTP.80 The core concept
the Commission advances is that a state’s sovereignty carries with it
the responsibility to protect the people within the state.81 When a
state fails in its duty through either inability or deliberate inaction,
sovereignty and its sister “principle of non-intervention [must] yield[]
to the international responsibility to protect”—shifting the responsibility to protect to the international community.82 This foundational
concept—that the state owes a duty to its citizens, the neglect or

73. Id. ¶¶ 165-66.
74. Id. ¶¶ 165-75.
75. See Robert P. Barnidge, Jr., The Due Diligence Principle Under International Law
8 INT’L COMMUNITY L. REV. 81, 81-82, available at http://ssrn.com/abstract=1156773.
76. See generally ICISS REPORT, supra note 13.
77. Id. paras. 1.7-1.9.
78. Id. at vii.
79. Id. at vii, paras. 1.7-1.9. Commentators note that the September 10, 2001 release
of the report, merely one day before the World Trade Center attacks, contributed to delays
in discussion of the doctrine following the release of the report. See, e.g., LEE FEINSTEIN,
COUNCIL ON FOREIGN RELATIONS, CSR No. 22, DARFUR AND BEYOND: WHAT IS NEEDED TO
PREVENT MASS ATROCITIES 8 (2007).
80. See generally ICISS REPORT, supra note 13.
81. Id. at xi.
82. Id.
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flouting of which opens the door to international intervention—is the
core of RTP.
The Commission grounds its reconceptualization of sovereignty in
three sources.83 First, the reconceptualization is grounded in the concept of sovereignty itself, which, by its definition, places responsibility
for the internal affairs of a state within the hands of that state.84 Second, the ICISS grounds its conception of sovereignty in states’ existing legal obligations in international law, asserting “state sovereignty
. . . cannot be an excuse for . . . non-performance”85 of existing human
rights and international law obligations.86 Third, the Commission looks
to the discourse and action of states and international organizations,
which support defining sovereignty as responsibility.87
The Commission builds upon the concept of sovereignty as responsibility to further define RTP. The ICISS articulates the triggering
conditions for RTP, which it terms the “Just Cause Threshold.”88 To
justify military intervention under RTP, the ICISS requires that:
serious and irreparable harm [is] occurring to human beings, or
[is] imminently likely to occur, of the following kind:
A. large scale loss of life, actual or apprehended, with genocidal intent or not, which is the product either of deliberate
state action, or state neglect or inability to act, or a failed state
situation; or
B. large scale ‘ethnic cleansing’, actual or apprehended,
whether carried out by killing, force expulsion, acts of terror
or rape. 89

Thus, the ICISS does not define the triggers of RTP through the language of international criminal and human rights law. It eschews
terms such as genocide or crimes against humanity—though the
Commission understands these thresholds to be inclusive of many
such crimes—in favor of more discretionary, descriptive guidelines.90
This stands in marked contrast to the U.N.’s reports and resolutions
that name specific crimes that trigger RTP.
Integral to the ICISS’s conception of RTP are three component responsibilities which combine to form the responsibility to protect: the
“responsibility to prevent,” “responsibility to react,” and the “respon-

83. See id.
84. See INT’L COMM’N ON INTERVENTION AND STATE SOVEREIGNTY, THE RESPONSIBILITY
TO PROTECT: RESEARCH, BIBLIOGRAPHY, BACKGROUND 6 (2001) [hereinafter ICISS
RESEARCH]; see also ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xi.
85. ICISS RESEARCH, supra note 84, at 7.
86. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xi; ICISS RESEARCH, supra note 84, at 7.
87. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xi; ICISS RESEARCH, supra note 84, at 10-12.
88. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xii.
89. Id. at xii.
90. Id. paras. 4.21-4.25.
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sibility to rebuild.”91 The Commission places distinct and strong emphasis on the primacy of prevention of conditions of widespread killing and rights abuses.92 While the duties nations have to aid in prevention could easily be the substance of a discussion of RTP, the focus of this paper is on the use of military intervention under the responsibility-to-react division of responsibility to protect.93 As such,
readers should simply note that the focus of responsibility to protect
is not solely upon justifying military intervention, but rather has a
more comprehensive scope.
Importantly, the ICISS further outlines specific conditions under
which the international community can invoke RTP to justify military intervention. As an examination of U.N. action regarding RTP
will show, though the U.N. did not wholesale adopt the ICISS conditions, the Committee’s recommendations are integral to a discussion
of how to advance RTP. In addition to articulating the just cause
threshold that must be met before RTP is triggered, the Commission
articulates four “[p]recautionary principles”94: “[r]ight intention,”
“last resort,” “proportional means,” and “reasonable prospects.”95 The
Commission envisions the principles as necessarily strong limits
placed upon military intervention to ensure against abuse and to further clarify when the international community may address a crisis
through the extreme tactic of military intervention.96
Each principle addresses common critiques of a doctrine that justifies intervention. Though right intention does not preclude states
having mixed-motives in their desire to intervene, it requires that the
“primary purpose . . . be to halt or avert human suffering;” thereby
addressing the concern that RTP could become a tool used by those
with less laudable intentions.97 The last resort principle ensures that
all peaceful or non-military coercive measures be attempted or considered prior to use of military intervention;98 precluding action by
those who would move first to military intervention. This principle
does, however, permit the deliberating nations to consider but not

91. Id. at xi.
92. Id. (“Prevention is the single most important dimension of the responsibility to
protect.”) (emphasis omitted). Id.
93. Id.
94. Id. at xii.
95. Id.
96. Id. para. 4.32 (“When both these and the threshold ‘just cause’ principle are taken
together . . . the Commission believes that they will strictly limit the use of coercive military force for human protection purposes. Our purpose is not to license aggression with fine
words, or to provide strong states with new rationales for doubtful strategic designs, but to
strengthen the order of states by providing for clear guidelines to guide concerted international action in those exceptional circumstances when violence within a state menaces
all peoples.”).
97. Id. at xii.
98. Id.
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ultimately employ a given peaceful tactic, if there exists “reasonable
grounds for believing . . . [said tactics] would not have succeeded.”99
Proportional means requires that the military intervention be the
“minimum necessary” to address the conflict.100 By mandating the
minimum intervention necessary, this principle speaks to concerns
that RTP will end in drawn-out and costly foreign occupations.101
Lastly, the reasonable prospect principle mitigates against illconceived interventions as it requires there to be, at the time of making the decision to intervene, a “reasonable chance of success” of the
intervention.102 The role of these four principles in addressing common concerns regarding any doctrine permitting intervention and in
structuring comprehensive framework for RTP as a doctrine is discussed in detail later.
The aforementioned principles delimit the doctrine but do not address who determines whether such principles are satisfied. The
Commission views the U.N. Security Council as holding primary responsibility for implementing RTP.103 Vesting this power in the Security Council recognizes the Council’s powers to address issues of international security under Articles 24 and 39-42 of the U.N. Charter.104 Doing so also accomplishes the goal of ensuring that any intervention is a multilateral, rather than unilateral, action which links
back to the precautionary principle of right intention, as no one nation’s desire determines whether an intervention proceeds.105 Under
Article 99, the ICISS recommends the Secretary-General or the Security Council authorize independent investigations into a crisis to determine if the situation meets the triggering conditions and principles.106 In addition to the results of such inquiries, the Security Council should consider regular reports of both U.N. agencies and
NGOs.107 The ICISS goes so far as to recognize alternative avenues of
intervention should the Security Council fail to act on such information, including emergency action by the General Assembly or extraU.N. action (either multi- or unilateral), though it disfavors these options.108 All the recommendations of this Note require the Security
99. Id.
100. Id.
101. For a discussion of why such principles should guide any intervention doctrine,
see Jane Stromseth, Rethinking Humanitarian Intervention: The Case for Incremental
Change, in HUMANITARIAN INTERVENTION: ETHICAL, LEGAL, AND POLITICAL DILEMMAS 232,
245-72 (J.L. Holzgrefe & Robert O. Keohane, eds., 2003).
102. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xii.
103. Id. at xii, paras. 6.2-6.3.
104. Id. paras. 6.3, 6.16.
105. Id. at xii, para. 6.12.
106. Id. paras. 4.29-4.31.
107. Id.
108. Id. at xii-xiii (“The Security Council should take into account . . . that, if it fails to
discharge its responsibility to protect . . . concerned states may not rule out other means
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Council to act as the authorizing agent for RTP. Therefore this Note
does not examine these alternative avenues in detail.
B. RTP at the U.N.
Since 2000, both the United Nations General Assembly and the
Security Council have developed an increasingly well-defined understanding of RTP. Then Secretary-General Annan laid the foundation for
recognizing the doctrine in a 2000 report. In that report, Annan unequivocally puts a powerful question before the international community:
I . . . accept that the principles of sovereignty and non-interference
offer vital protection to small and weak states. But to critics I
would pose this question: if humanitarian intervention is, indeed,
an unacceptable assault on sovereignty, how should we respond to
Rwanda, to a Srebrenica—to gross and systematic violations of
human rights that offend every precept of our common humanity?109

Annan goes on to specifically challenge sovereignty, stating: “surely
no legal principle—not even sovereignty—can ever shield crimes
against humanity.”110 In closing, the Secretary-General then recognizes the Security Council’s “moral duty to act on behalf of the international community” when other attempts to stop atrocities fail.111
Members of the ICISS formed the Commission and drafted its foundational report on RTP doctrine as a response to “compelling
pleas.”112 The 2000 report, however, was only the beginning of discussion of RTP at the U.N.
The General Assembly built upon Annan’s first plea and the subsequent ICISS report in two crucial reports in 2004 and 2005: A More
Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility and In Larger Freedom:
Towards Development, Security and Human Rights for All.113 In the
2004 report, the General Assembly does not adopt specific language
defining RTP.114 However, the report makes two crucial contributions
[to intervention] . . . and that the stature and credibility of the United Nations may
suffer thereby.”).
109. U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples, supra note 32, ¶ 217.
110. Id. ¶ 219.
111. Id.
112. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at vii.
113. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom: Towards Development,
Security and Human Rights for All, delivered to the General Assembly and the Security
Council, U.N. Doc A/59/2005 (Mar. 25, 2005) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom]; U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World: Our Shared Responsibility, ¶¶
199-203, delivered to the Security Council and the General Assembly, U.N. Doc A/59/565
(Dec. 2, 2004) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World].
114. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World, supra note 113, ¶¶
199-203. Rather than adopting specific language, the report states that: “We endorse the
emerging norm that there is a collective international responsibility to protect, exercisable
by the Security Council authorizing military intervention as a last resort, in the event of
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to RTP doctrine. First, the report affirms the doctrine as an “emerging norm,”115 thereby increasing the doctrine’s credibility in the international community. Second, the report grounds the doctrine in
the existing obligation states possess under the Convention on the
Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide.116 The responsibility States have under the Convention requires that the “principle
of non-intervention”117 yield to the “ ‘responsibility to protect’ of every
State when it comes to people suffering from avoidable catastrophe.”118 By finding a basis for RTP in already existing obligations, the
G.A. report further reinforces RTP as a valid development in international law, rather than a figment of its imagination.
The 2005 report builds upon this foundation. In this report, the
Secretary-General expressly asks heads of state to “[e]mbrace the
‘responsibility to protect’ as a basis for collective action against genocide, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity, and [to] agree to
act on this responsibility . . . .”119 Thus, the Secretary-General asks
nations to not only recognize the principle of RTP but to recognize it
as a doctrine that requires action, rather than merely an aspirational
principle. Taken together, the General Assembly’s reports of 2004
and 2005 culminated in the General Assembly Resolution 2005 World
Summit Outcome.
The 2005 World Summit Outcome provides the definition of RTP
the U.N. General Assembly adopted at the close of discussion on
RTP. The actual language the General Assembly adopted in its resolution is as follows:
138. Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of
such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and
necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it. The international community should, as appropriate,
encourage and help States to exercise this responsibility and support the United Nations in establishing an early warning capability.
139. The international community, through the United Nations,
also has the responsibility to use appropriate diplomatic, humanitarian and other peaceful means, in accordance with Chapters VI
and VIII of the Charter, to help to protect populations from genogenocide and other large scale killing, ethnic cleansing, or serious violations of international humanitarian law which sovereign Governments have proved powerless or unwilling
to prevent.” Id. ¶ 203.
115. Id. ¶ 203.
116. Id. ¶ 200 (“Under the . . . [Genocide Convention], States have agreed that genocide
. . . is a crime under international law which they undertake to prevent and punish.”).
117. Id.
118. Id. ¶ 201.
119. U.N. Secretary-General, In Larger Freedom, supra note 113, Annex, ¶ 7(a)- (b)
(emphasis added).
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cide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity. In
this context, we are prepared to take collective action, in a timely
and decisive manner, through the Security Council, in accordance
with the Charter, including Chapter VII, on a case-by-case basis
and in cooperation with relevant regional organizations as appropriate, should peaceful means be inadequate and national authorities are manifestly failing to protect their populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity.
We stress the need for the General Assembly to continue consideration of the responsibility to protect populations from genocide,
war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity and its
implications, bearing in mind the principles of the Charter and international law. We also intend to commit ourselves, as necessary
and appropriate, to helping States build capacity to protect their
populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and
crimes against humanity and to assisting those which are under
stress before crises and conflicts break out.120

The language the General Assembly adopts narrows the ICISS’s
proposed definition in two important ways. Recall that the ICISS defines the triggering crimes for RTP as “large scale loss of life or large
scale ‘ethnic cleansing.’ ”121 The U.N. is more specific, identifying four
triggering crimes: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity.122 Additionally, the U.N. places the duty to exercise RTP exclusively in the hands of the Security Council.123 This decision contrasts with the ICISS proposal, which allows for action
through the General Assembly or multinational organizations.124
These changes are critical to constructing an RTP that is sufficiently
broad to be effective, but also narrow enough that nations will agree
to be bound by the doctrine.
The 2005 World Summit Outcome defines RTP for the international community. Subsequent U.N. action further elucidated the
boundaries of the doctrine and strengthened the international community’s commitment to RTP. In two separate resolutions, the Security Council reaffirmed its recognition of and commitment to advancing the doctrine.125 At a 2008 Berlin conference on responsible sovereignty, Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon emphasized the continued
importance of implementing RTP, which he characterized as “narrow

120. 2005 World Summit Outcome, G.A. Res. 60/1, ¶¶ 138-39, U.N. Doc A/RES/60/1
(Oct. 24, 2005) (emphasis added).
121. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xii.
122. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 120, ¶ 138 (emphasis added).
123. Id. ¶ 139.
124. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xiii; see also Pace & Deller, supra note 25, at 29.
125. S.C. Res. 1894, pmbl., U.N. Doc. S/RES/1894 (Nov. 11, 2009); S.C. Res. 1674, ¶ 4,
U.N. Doc. S/RES/1674 (Apr. 28, 2006).
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but deep.”126 Finally and most recently, the Secretary-General issued
the 2009 report, Implementing the Responsibility to Protect.127 Principally, this document calls for the U.N. to shift from discussing the
boundaries of RTP to developing the U.N. “strategy, standards, processes, tools and practices for the responsibility to protect.”128 The Secretary-General understands that it is time to determine the future of
RTP, as should the international community.
U.N. documents from 2000-2009 chronicle the development of RTP
doctrine, define its boundaries, and underscore the importance of the
international community committing to RTP. The U.N. has left us
with a call to determine how to implement RTP,129 a call that mirrors
the plea Annan made in 2000 for the international community to
construct an intervention doctrine.130 The proposals of this Note answer that call by recommending how the U.N. can build upon its existing conception of RTP to create a doctrine that should become
binding international law.
IV. MOVING FORWARD WITH RTP
RTP is a young doctrine, having only entered into international
discussion under that title in 2001. No binding U.N. resolution has
focused on it, though the U.N. has a well-developed framework for
the doctrine. No states have drafted international treaties regarding
its contents and applicability.131 As such, the doctrine still has room
to breathe, to evolve, and, where necessary, to expand. What follows
is a discussion of how to proceed in crafting an RTP that is robust
and broad enough to honor the doctrine’s fundamental goal of protecting
vulnerable persons, while also being sufficiently narrow and wellconceived to appease critics of a doctrine which requires intervention.
As the doctrine currently rests, it successfully removes one of the
blocks to intervention: the non-intervention norm. Where countries
could previously cloak their inaction in the concept of nonintervention,132 RTP eradicates that pre-textual block to intervention
by requiring the international community to intervene in the face of
certain atrocities.133 While this is a decisive step forward, it is not sufficient. As a non-binding norm, RTP does little to address the second,

126. U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Defends, Clarifies ‘Responsibility to
Protect’ at Berlin Event, U.N. Doc. SG/SM/11701 (July 15, 2008) [hereinafter U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Defends].
127. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing, supra note 33.
128. Id. at summary.
129. Id.
130. See U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples, supra note 32, ¶¶ 217-19.
131. See supra text accompanying notes 109-30.
132. ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at xxx.
133. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 120, ¶¶ 138-39.
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and perhaps most fatal block to intervention: lack of political will.134
History shows us that the international community’s failure to act “in
response to each of the major genocides of the twentieth century
[was] not the accidental product[] of neglect[,] [but rather a] concrete
choice[] made by the world’s most influential decision makers after
implicit and explicit weighing of costs and benefits.”135 Absent a requirement to act, selfishness will defeat idealism and atrocities will
continue.136 A binding RTP can enter the fight on the side of idealism.
Existing scholarship on RTP, combined with aspects of the U.N. and
ICISS’s conceptions of the doctrine, provide a roadmap for articulating a binding doctrine.
At this juncture in the development of international law and RTP,
the Security Council must control the implementation of RTP.
Though the ICISS proposal permits extra-Security Council action,
this option takes RTP too far outside the current structure of international law.137 Per the language of the U.N. Charter, the U.N., as a
collectivity “maintain[s] international peace and security” and serves
as a “center for harmonizing the actions of nations in the attainment
of . . . common ends.”138 As such, this proposal advances RTP in line
with U.N. interpretations of the doctrine which place authority in the
hands of the Security Council.139
Though the focus of his critique of RTP is the failure of the international community to develop the preventative aspect of the doctrine, Hitoshi Nasu provides a helpful framework for considering the
principle areas of RTP which require further development: the
“scope, stage, and strength” of the doctrine.140 “Scope” encompasses
which crimes/actions in a conflict will trigger RTP.141 “Stage” refers to
when the duty to protect becomes that of the international community
or, stated differently, when the “sovereign state” has failed to fulfill
its RTP.142 Lastly, “strength” embraces the level and “choice of methods”

134. See U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Defends, supra note 126 (“Today
the responsibility to protect is a concept, not yet a policy; an aspiration, not yet a reality.”).
But see Pace & Deller, supra note 25, at 20 (“Meeting the criteria would encourage action
where political will is otherwise lacking or is obstructed by one country’s strategic interests.”).
135. Power, supra note 35, at 256.
136. BASS, supra note 38, at 8.
137. See ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xiii; see also ICISS RESEARCH, supra note 84,
at 7 (identifying the U.N. as the “principle institution for . . . using the authority of the
international community.”).
138. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 1, 4.
139. See G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 120, ¶ 139.
140. Hitoshi Nasu, Operationalizing the ‘Responsibility to Protect’ and Conflict Prevention: Dilemmas of Civilian Protection in Armed Conflict, 14 J. CONFLICT AND SECURITY L.
209, 213 (2009).
141. Id.
142. Id.
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of intervention permissible in a given conflict.143 The scope and stage
elements of RTP form the primary focus for the following discussion.
Defining both the scope and stage is critical to articulating a more
complete doctrine by better conceptualizing the triggering conditions
for international intervention. Scope speaks to what types of conflict
or which on the ground situations fall within the bounds of RTP. Assuming the conflict falls within the scope of RTP, when is it eligible
for international action or intervention? Defining what it means for a
state to have failed in its responsibility to protect, either through deliberate inaction or inability, delimits the stage and therein addresses this concern.
While the ICISS report first defined RTP, the U.N. reports and
resolutions on the doctrine better define its scope. Recall that the
U.N. 2005 World Summit Outcome names the four crimes, which
trigger RTP: genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing, and crimes
against humanity.144 Four triggering crimes, as opposed to the discretionary categories of “large scale loss of life or large scale ‘ethnic
cleansing’ ”145 which the ICISS report proposes. By limiting RTP’s
application to only these four crimes, the U.N. limits the scope of the
doctrine. This limitation significantly narrows which factual scenarios can trigger RTP which, in turn, undermines concerns that the
doctrine will be used to intervene in any situation the international
community desires. Logically, increased specificity of the triggering
factual scenarios decreases the margin for abuse of the doctrine.146
To further narrow the scope of RTP, a doctrine must go beyond the
definition adopted by the U.N. Definitions of the four triggering
crimes appear in, the Rome Statute, Genocide Convention and Security Council Resolutions establishing the International Criminal Tribunal for the former Yugoslavia (ICTY) and the International Criminal Tribunal for Rwanda (ICTR), as well as precedent of the International Court of Justice (ICJ) and the International Criminal Court
(ICC).147 Any resolution or treaty creating a binding RTP must explicitly limit the scope of the four triggering crimes to their definitions in
current international law. As Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon states
in his 2009 report, “the best way to discourage States or groups of
143. Id.
144. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 120, ¶ 138 (emphasis added).
145. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xii.
146. See U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Defends, supra note 126 (“Likewise, if United Nations rules procedures and practices are developed . . . there is less likelihood of RTP principles being used to justify extra-legal interventions for other purposes.”). Id.
147. See, e.g., Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, art. 7, July 17, 1998,
2187 U.N.T.S. 90. (defining crime against humanity: “For the purpose of this Statute,
‘crime against humanity’ means any of the following acts when committed as part of a
widespread or systematic attack directed against any civilian population, with knowledge
of the attack: (a) Murder; (b) Extermination . . . .”).
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States from misusing [RTP] for inappropriate purposes would be to
develop fully” the doctrine and guidelines for implementation.148 By
limiting the scope of the doctrine to four trigger crimes, the 2005
World Summit resolution takes a step toward that goal. This proposal for a binding RTP takes that task a step further by explicitly
incorporating current international law definitions of the trigger
crimes and thereby decreasing the potential for abuse of RTP.
Having further narrowed the scope of RTP, it is necessary to shift
to defining the stage for RTP. Here again, the U.N. resolution on RTP
productively narrows the definition while protecting the efficacy of
the doctrine. Recall that if the ICISS found a state “unwilling or unable” to prevent or stop a crisis, it considered RTP to come into effect.149 The U.N. increases this threshold requirement as it mandates
that a state be “manifestly failing to protect [its] population[] from”
the four triggering crimes.150 Manifestly failing is markedly stronger
language than unable or unwilling. Consequently, it narrows the
stage on which the international community will have to perform its
responsibility to protect. This stronger language brings the stage requirement into line with the narrower scope of crimes that trigger
RTP which the U.N. adopted and which this Note supports. Narrower
scope and stage requirements will make RTP more palatable to skeptical states, as the more refined the trigger conditions, the more limited is RTP; for example, there will be fewer situations which will
trigger the doctrine and therefore fewer interventions to which a
state must commit. Simultaneously, though these requirements narrow RTP, they do not dilute it; the doctrine remains strong enough to
require intervention in the worst atrocities.
While the U.N. language productively narrows RTP’s stage, it does
little to clarify how to determine the level of state inaction that constitutes a manifest failure. Recall that this Note endorses the ICISS
proposal that the Security Council utilize independent inquiries into
a crisis to evaluate the presence of RTP trigger factors. Most scholars
recognize that insufficient intelligence is no longer the principle challenge in intervention cases.151 Rather, in the era of high-speed communication, “it is much harder to kill [people] in secret.”152 In keeping
with that reality, this Note proposes that if a Security Council inquiry into a crisis establishes evidence of a triggering crime in the
state in question, that finding creates a rebuttable presumption that
148. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing, supra note 33, at summary.
149. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xi.
150. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 120, ¶ 139.
151. See, e.g., POWER, supra note 37, at 354-55 (describing the intelligence missions
and reports the U.S. directed and drafted regarding Rwanda); see also U.N. SecretaryGeneral, Implementing, supra note 33, ¶ 6 (noting that there were “warning signs” for each
of recent history’s “worst human tragedies”).
152. Walzer, supra note 62, at 19.
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the state is manifestly failing to address the crisis. Any state that
opposes intervention would then have to definitively establish the
falsity of the presumption. This proposal links the high standards for
the scope and stage of RTP in a logical manner—the evidence of an
atrocity tends to prove that the state responsible to prevent it has
failed to do so—while providing a safety valve should the facts not, in
reality, require intervention. As such, the proposed conception of RTP
again strikes a balance between appeasing reluctant states and
maintaining the strength of the doctrine.
In addition to embracing language to refine the scope and stage of
RTP, a binding conceptualization of RTP should adopt all of the proposed ICISS precautionary principles: “[r]ight intention,” “last resort,” “proportional means,” and “reasonable prospects.”153 Each principle reinforces the inherent nature of intervention under RTP as a
humanitarian endeavor.154 The ICISS proposes, however, that the
principles form part of a threshold evidentiary requirement that the
Security Council must establish before intervening.155 As threshold
evidentiary requirements, the principles are too unwieldy. The Security Council can look to international treaties and case law to determine if a given situation satisfies, for example, the definition of genocide and therein triggers RTP. There are no similar sources for these
precautionary principles. Thus, rather than evidentiary requirements, the proposed conceptualization of RTP adopts the principles
as policy guidelines, conceptual checkpoints the Security Council
should look to as it evaluates an intervention strategy once it has established that a triggering crime is occurring. Keeping the principles
as policy guidelines advances the goals of the ICISS in drafting
them,156 without adding an amorphous and highly discretionary step
to the process of determining whether a situation triggers RTP.
The final proposal of this Note shifts attention from definitions of
RTP and which factual patterns trigger international intervention to
the issue of the Security Council veto power. Many scholars and proponents of RTP call for the five permanent members of the Security
Council to forego their veto power when considering intervention under RTP.157 In his report on implementing RTP, Secretary-General
Ban Ki-Moon speaks on the solemn responsibility of the five permanent members of the Security Council:

153. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xii.
154. Id. para. 4.32. For a full discussion of the principles, see supra text accompanying
notes 94-102.
155. Id. paras. 4.28-4.32.
156. Id. para. 4.32. (identifying the role of the principles in shaping policy of RTP).
157. See, e.g., U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing, supra note 33, ¶ 61; Amnesty
Int’l, supra note 36.
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[T]he Secretary-General bears particular responsibility for ensuring that the international community responds in a ‘timely and decisive’ manner, as called for in paragraph 139 of the Summit Outcome. . . . Within the Security-Council, the five permanent members bear particular responsibility because of the privileges of tenure and the veto power they have been granted under the Charter.
I would urge them to refrain from employing or threatening to employ the veto in situations of manifest failure to meet obligations
relating to the responsibility to protect . . . and to reach a mutual
understanding to that effect.158

The Secretary-General both draws attention to the gravity of the veto
power, as well as calls upon the permanent members to “reach a mutual
understanding” that they ought to forego that power in the RTP context.159 At the proposal of a representative of one of the five permanent
members, the ICISS endorsed a similar concept of “constructive abstention” of a state’s veto power in “matters where [that state’s] vital
national interests were not claimed to be involved.”160 While such
proposals are constructive, they are insufficient as they leave RTP to
the whim of the political will and self-interest of five nations.
Per Article 23 of the U.N. Charter, the U.S., the U.K., France,
China and Russia sit as the permanent members of the Security
Council.161 In its current form, the veto power permits any one of the
five permanent members of the Security Council to determine the
action or inaction of the Council; should one permanent member object to an action, the Council cannot proceed.162 In recent years, China
has used the veto power to cripple Security Council action in Darfur163 due, at least in part, to its economic interests in Sudan and Sudanese oil.164 Many policymakers call for general reform of the veto
power, labeling it “the greatest flaw in the U.N.’s constitutional edifice.”165 This paper calls not for a sweeping reform of the veto power,
but rather a reform which pertains only to its exercise in situations
which trigger RTP.
To fully address the challenge of overcoming the veto power of the
five permanent members of the Security Council, RTP must include a
binding provision which overrides that power once a situation triggers the doctrine. The ICISS proposal calls for voluntary, constructive abstention of the veto power by the permanent members when
158. U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing, supra note 33, ¶ 61 (emphasis omitted).
159. Id.
160. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, para. 6.21.
161. U.N. Charter, art. 23.
162. NIGEL D. WHITE, THE UNITED NATIONS SYSTEM: TOWARD INTERNATIONAL JUSTICE
140 (2002).
163. Feinstein, supra note 79, at 13.
164. See Press Release, Human Rights First, China’s Oil Interests in Sudan Fueling Darfur
Violence, Mar. 12, 2008, available at http://www.commondreams.org/news2008/0312-04.htm.
165. See, e.g., WHITE, supra note 162, at 303.
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there was a majority in favor of intervention.166 Rather than a nonbinding mutual agreement, the existence of a majority in support of
intervention must trigger a binding requirement that no member of
the permanent five use its veto power. To trigger the prohibition of
the veto, however, the majority in favor of intervention must be a
“majority +”—meaning it must include one or more members of the
Security Council. The doctrine should, however, draw upon the ICISS
proposal to provide an escape valve. Should a nation’s “vital state interests”167 be threatened, that member could exercise her veto power,
regardless of the existence of a “majority +” rule.
The proposed reform to the veto power has two advantages: one
moral and one practical. First, creating a binding bar to the veto
power precludes the “unconscionable [reality] that one veto can override the rest of humanity on matters of grave humanitarian concern.”168 Second, a limited, context-specific reform of the veto power
may be more palatable to the permanent five than would a sweeping
overhaul of the system. Requiring at least one member of the permanent five to be within the majority ensures that the will of the nonpermanent members cannot wholly override that of the permanent
five, a concession to the controlling status of the permanent five. At
least one permanent member of the Security Council supported an
agreement by the five to refrain from use of the veto power within
RTP context, which suggests that there may be a foundation of support upon which to build in order to create a binding provision.169
Though they recognize it as an “uphill battle,” activists have identified both the U.K. and France as likely the most open to reform of the
veto.170 Getting the permanent members of the Security Council to
sign onto a document which, however limited in scope, reforms their
veto power, is inevitably an uphill battle. It is, however, a battle
worth fighting because absent such a reform, RTP will be a markedly
weaker doctrine.171

166. ICISS REPORT, supra note 13, at xiii.
167. Id. para. 8.29(2).
168. Id. para. 6.20 (highlighting the profound detrimental impact of the veto power in
human rights crises).
169. See id. para. 6.21. But see, HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER, THE RESPONSIBILITY TO
PROTECT (R2P): MOVING THE CAMPAIGN FORWARD 54 (2007) (“[I]n general, P5 members
expressed their opposition to the abolition of the veto or to modifications that would be
ratified through Charter amendment, including General Assembly guidelines on how the
veto shall be exercised.”), available at http://www.law.berkeley.edu/HRCweb/pdfs/R2PFinal-Report.pdf.
170. HUMAN RIGHTS CENTER, supra note 169, at 56.
171. See id. at 52-54 (“The use of the veto by P5 members has hindered the Security
Council’s ability to respond to conflict situations where mass atrocities, including genocide
and crimes against humanity, are being committed.”).
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A. Why Nations Should Adopt a Binding RTP
Proponents of the slow evolution of international law argue
against a deliberate attempt to define the bounds of a doctrine in favor of an “incremental development of normative consensus.”172 Such
critics fail to give full credit to the support and consensus RTP has
already garnered. RTP already stands upon solid ground. The 2005
World Summit recognized the norm in “language . . . sufficiently
strong to be considered an endorsement of a new set of principles”173:
Each individual State has the responsibility to protect its populations from genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes
against humanity. This responsibility entails the prevention of
such crimes, including their incitement, through appropriate and
necessary means. We accept that responsibility and will act in accordance with it.174

Since 2005, the U.N. has only strengthened its commitment to RTP
through repeated reports and resolutions which affirm and further
refine the doctrine.175 The Secretary-General has shifted focus to implementing the RTP doctrine.176 The proposals of this Note further
delimit and define RTP, framing it in accordance with SecretaryGeneral Ban Ki-moon’s conception of it providing “deep,” significant
protections in “narrow” circumstances.177 We have a principle; now
we must move forward with it.
First and perhaps most urgently, states should accede to a binding
RTP because the lives of thousands if not millions of individuals hang
in the balance. How the international community reacts to a future
Rwanda could be determinative of whether thousands live or die.
“[T]he last decade of the twentieth century was one of the most deadly in the grimmest century on record”;178 without a binding norm, the
world is free to watch as other people die. The sheer moral force of
what is at stake—thousands of human lives—puts a thumb on the
scale of solidifying RTP doctrine into a binding principle of international law. At its inception, the Nuremberg Tribunal was unprecedented.179 The profound human suffering of the Holocaust incensed
the international community, driving it to create a new institution to
hold responsible the perpetrators of the atrocities.180 If states accede

172. Stromseth, supra note 101, at 245 (emphasis omitted).
173. Pace & Deller, supra note 25, at 27.
174. G.A. Res. 60/1, supra note 120, ¶ 138 (emphasis added).
175. See, e.g., S.C. 1894, supra note 125, pmbl.; U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing,
supra note 33.
176. See generally U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing, supra note 33.
177. U.N. Secretary-General, Secretary-General Defends, supra note 126.
178. Power, supra note 35, at 251.
179. See ROBERTSON, supra note 2, at xxii.
180. Id.
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to a binding RTP, they advance international law in the same vein as
the creation of Nuremberg; unprecedented as it was, the tribunal was
also an unquestionable good. Annan knew in 2000 that nations have
a “moral duty” to protect their brethren.181 Now, those nations must
honor their idealism over self-interest and accept that this duty compels them to accept RTP as a binding precept.182
Over and above the moral duty that compels action, existing obligations under international law support the proposition that states
must intervene to prevent atrocities and should do so through RTP.
The Genocide Convention provides the clearest example of this existing obligation. The Convention defines genocide and states, in Article
1: “The Contracting Parties confirm that genocide, whether committed in time of peace or in time of war, is a crime under international
law which they undertake to prevent and to punish.”183 One hundred
and forty-one nations acceded to the treaty and are thus bound by its
substance.184 By grounding RTP in these nations’ existing duty to
prevent genocide, the 2004 and 2009 General Assembly reports
strengthen the argument that RTP is simply an articulation of principles that already bind states to intervene in the face of atrocities.185
As such, nations should accede to a binding treaty or support a resolution on RTP as an affirmation of their existing obligations under
international law.
In 2007, the International Court of Justice strengthened the link
between RTP and an existing obligation to prevent genocide under
the Genocide Convention.186 The case addressed Serbia and Montenegro’s liability for genocide against citizens of Bosnia and Herzegovina
in the early 1990s.187 By analyzing the plain language of the Convention, the court identified the responsibilities to prevent and to punish
181. U.N. Secretary-General, We the Peoples, supra note 32, ¶ 219.
182. See generally BASS, supra note 38, at 8, 21-32 (discussing the battle between idealism and selfishness of liberal states).
183. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide art. 1,
Jan. 12, 1981, 78 U.N.T.S. 277, available at, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&lang=en.
184. See U.N. Treaty Collection, Chapter IV: Human Rights Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Apr. 23, 2010, http://treaties.un.org/Pages/
ViewDetails.aspx?src=UNTSONLINE&tabid=2&mtdsg_no=IV-1&chapter=4&lang=en.
185. See U.N. Secretary-General, Implementing, supra note 33, ¶ 3 (RTP is “firmly
anchored in well-established principles of international law. Under conventional and customary international law, States have obligations to prevent and punish genocide, war
crimes and crimes against humanity.”); U.N. Secretary-General, A More Secure World,
supra note 113, ¶ 200.
186. See generally Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of
the Crime of Genocide (Bosn. & Herz. v. Serb. & Mont.), 2007 I.C.J. 169, ¶¶ 425-32 (Feb.
26). See also W. Michael Reisman, Acting Before Victims Become Victims: Preventing and
Arresting Mass Murder 40. CASE W. RES. J. INT’L L. 57, 80-82 (2008) (“the judgment expanded
the responsibility of individual states to act to prevent and arrest genocide.”). Id. at 81.
187. Application of the Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of
Genocide, 2007 I.C.J. 169, ¶¶ 231-34.
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genocide as “two distinct yet connected obligations.”188 While the
court recognized how closely related the two principles are, it firmly
stated “it is not the case that the obligation to prevent has no separate legal existence of its own.”189 Rather, the duty to prevent “is one
of conduct [meaning] that a State cannot be under an obligation to
succeed . . . the obligation of States parties is rather to employ all
means reasonably available to them, so as to prevent genocide so far
is possible.”190 Though the court did not expressly discuss RTP, its
decision supports the link between RTP and existing obligations under the Genocide Convention by finding a duty to act in the Convention’s language of prevention. RTP advances the duty to act embodied
in the Genocide Convention and similar treaties by synthesizing their
content to create a unified principle which requires the international
community to intervene in the face of the worst human crises: genocide, war crimes, crimes against humanity, and ethnic cleansing.
V. FULFILLING PROMISES: CONCLUSION
Those who hesitate to recognize a binding RTP may challenge that
it is sufficient as an aspirational doctrine. After all, as little as ten
years ago, no one was even discussing the responsibility to protect as
such. While scholar Gary Bass writes on the problem of placing too
much faith in international tribunals, his observation applies to placing too much faith in an aspirational principle:
The idea that all international problems will dissolve with the establishment of an international court with compulsory jurisdiction
is an invitation to political indolence. It allows one to make no alterations in domestic political action and thought, to change no attitudes, to try no new approaches and yet to appear to be working
for peace.191

A non-binding RTP is just that: a commitment a nation can make,
give itself a pat on the back, and then continue on with the status
quo. That possibility is unacceptable. The stakes are too high. Too
many lives are at risk.
In its current form, RTP gets the international community over
the hurdle of the non-intervention norm, but that feat alone is not
enough. History and scholarship on intervention teach us that, more
often then not, nations lack the political will to intervene to save the
lives of strangers.192 This Note proposes that nations adopt a binding
RTP that is an amalgamation of U.N. and ICISS definitions of the

188.
189.
190.
191.
192.

Id. at ¶ 425.
Id. ¶¶ 426-27.
Id. ¶ 430.
BASS, supra note 38, at 282 (citation omitted).
See, e.g., Power, supra note 35, at 256.
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doctrine, as well as scholarship on intervention and reforming the
veto power. Mustering the necessary political will to bind themselves
to RTP requires nations to critically examine their existing obligations under the Genocide Convention and other major international
treaties, alongside the compelling moral arguments in favor of intervention. Upon doing so, nations must inevitably realize they have
already made the commitment to act. RTP stands ready to advance
the language and spirit of international human rights and humanitarian law—it is simply waiting for the international community to
fulfill its promises.

